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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies how monetary policy decisions affect the gender pay gap across UK 
households through a survey database. The results signify the impact of monetary 
policy shocks on the gap; monetary authorities’ decisions carry welfare effects for 
households through their pay income. 
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Monetary policymakers have recently discussed the potential distributional 
effects of monetary policy (MP) (Bernanke, 2015). The literature emphasizes potential 
distributional effects of MP on economic inequality, while no attention has been given 
on their impact on gender pay gaps. This paper focuses on the dynamic responses of 
the gender pay gap to MP shocks in the UK. Gender pay gaps come from household-
level data from the British Household Panel Survey, available from 1991 to 2008, and 
the Understanding Society (USoc) Microdata database available from 2009. The full 
panel sequence, which began in 1991, is maintained for researchers. Gender pay gaps 
in the UK remain substantial and reducing these differences is high on the economic 
policy agenda (Olsen et al., 2018). Understanding these differences is important for 
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how best to address low pay and a lack of wage progression. Poverty is increasingly a 
problem of low pay rather than lack of employment. Understanding this gap is 
important in cases that so many families are left in poverty as a result of low wages. 
The literature has not paid any attention on the potential distributional effects of MP 
decisions reached by the Bank of England on those gaps.  
 
2. Data and analysis 
The analysis uses 23,909 individuals from both databases, along with 
observations for the official Bank Rate. Data span the period 1991-2015 and along with 
the consumer price index and the unemployment rate are obtained from the National 
Statistics Office. Gender pay gaps are measured as the average hourly earnings of the 
interviewed individuals. Measures for earnings are gross per hour, while hourly gross 
wages are calculated as the employee’s cash and non-cash incomes per year divided by 
the number of hours usually worked per year (including overtime). Table 1 presents 
correlations between gender pay gaps and inflation, unemployment and the official 
Bank Rate. All series are Hodrick-Prescott (HP)-filtered. Correlations of the gap with 
inflation and interest rates are relatively high and negative. These findings point toward 
strong links between business cycles and gender pay gap patterns. 
Table 1 
Correlations between gender pay gaps and inflation and policy interest rates. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Correlations with:    Inflation rate      Unemployment rate             Bank Rate 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Gender pay gap          -0.46   0.57   -0.52 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Τhe analysis follows Romer and Romer (2004) to identify shocks to MP purged of 
anticipatory effects related to economic conditions. They construct a measure of such 
shocks from the component of policy changes at each monetary policy committee 
(MPC) meeting that is orthogonal to the Fed’s information set. They generate a 
3 
 
sequence of MP shocks at the frequency of MPC meetings by estimating the following 
regression: 
          p1           p2           p3 
Δbrm = α + β brbm + Σγi FmΔym,i + Σλi (FmΔym,i − Fm−1Δym,i) + Σϕi Fmπm,i +  
        i=-1          i=-1          i=-1 
 
  p4 
 Σθi (Fmπm,i − Fm−1πm,i) + μi Fmunm,i + δ1 DUM2008 + δ2 DUM1992 + δ3 DUM1997  
i=-1 
 
+ εm           (1) 
 
where m denotes the MPC meeting,  brm is the bank rate from the MPC meeting, brbm 
is the target of the policy rate going into the MPC meeting, FmΔym,i is the forecast from 
meeting m of real output growth  around  meeting  m (−1  is  previous quarter), Fmπm,i 
are inflation forecasts, and Fmun are forecasts of the current meeting’s unemployment 
rate. DUM2008 is a dummy that considers the 2008 global financial crisis, taking values 
of one in the third quarter in 2008, and zero otherwise, DUM1992 is a dummy that 
considers the adoption by the Bank of England (BoE) of an inflation targeting strategy, 
taking values of one in the third quarter in 1992, and zero otherwise, while DUM1997 
is a dummy associated with the fact that in May 1997 the full control of interest rates 
was left to the BoE, taking values of one in the second quarter in 1997, and zero 
otherwise (Adam et al., 2005). Within one quarter, there are four MPC meetings (one 
per month), therefore, for the quarterly estimates, the average of the economic variables 
included in Equation (1) are obtained. Estimates are reported in Table 2. The estimated 
residuals are then defined as the MP shocks. 
Table 2  
Estimates of the MP shocks (Equation (1)). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 




Constant    0.4628**  0.04 
brbm     0.0058***  0.00 
FmΔym,i(-1)    0.0047**  0.05 
FmΔym,i(0)    0.0096***  0.00 
FmΔym,i(1)    0.0063***  0.01 
FmΔym,i − Fm−1Δym,i(-1)  0.0038*  0.06 
FmΔym,i − Fm−1Δym,i(0)  0.0084***  0.00 
Fmπm,i(-1)    0.0041**  0.03 
Fmπm,i(0)    0.0079***  0.01 
Fmπm,i(1)    0.0058**  0.03 
Fmπm,i − Fm−1πm,i(-1)   0.0035*  0.06 
Fmπm,i − Fm−1πm,i(0)   0.0089***  0.00 
Fmunm,i    0.0057**  0.03 
DUM2008    -0.026***  0.00 
DUM1992    -0.049***  0.00 
DUM1997    -0.038***  0.00 
R2-adjusted    0.52 
No. of observations   100 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The lags were determined through the Akaike criterion. *: p≤0.10; **: p≤0.05; ***: p≤0.01. 
     





               p1                 p2          p3          
gapit = c + Σαj gapt−j + Σβj εbrt−j + Σγj Xt-j + vit     (2) 
             j=1    j=0          j=0 
where i denotes the ith individual in the survey, t is for time, X represents a vector of 
other variables affecting the pay gap (mentioned below), εbr proxies the MP shocks and 
vt is the residual term. To match the (annual) number of individuals with (quarterly) 
interest-rate shocks, we obtained the annual average of the quarterly shocks. The results 
are presented in Table 3. They identify a negative effect from MP on the gender pay 
gap. In other words, MP shocks have discernable effects on the gender pay gap: 
contractionary (higher interest rates) shocks are followed by a rise in those gaps and 
vice versa. The findings are consistent with other evidence for the economic effects of 
monetary shocks. Romer and Romer (2004) find that the maximum effect of monetary 
shocks on GDP occurs two years after a shock and the effect remains significant after 
then. Gornemann et al. (2016) also document that MP is extremely persistent so that a 
monetary shock is propagated for a long time.  
 The analysis also ensures that the results are robust to factors, which could 
contribute to gender pay gaps, such as income tax rates (top marginal income tax rate 
for households-obtained from the UK Office of National Statistics), centralized 
collective bargaining (proxied by the Centralized Collective Bargaining-CCB index of 
the Economic Freedom Index compiled by the Fraser Institute and scores go onto a 
[0,10] interval), economic competition (proxied by the component of the Economic 
Freedom Index compiled by the Fraser Institute), the public/private employment ratio 
(measured as the civilian government employment as a percentage of the working age 
population 15-64-obtained from the UK Office of National Statistics), and a measure 
of overall earnings dispersion (the 90th percentile minus 10th percentile wage gap-
wages data also come from the UK Office of National Statistics).  
In terms of taxation, females’ labor supply is more elastic, and therefore more 
sensitive to tax rates. Married women might find it advantageous to specialize in 
household activities when a large proportion of secondary earner income goes into 
paying taxes (Baffoe-Bonnie, 1995; Smith et al., 2003). Blau and Kahn (2003) argue 
that bargaining centralization reduces pay gaps across firms and sectors, because 
bargaining includes more firms and sectors into a common wage settlement. 
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Centralized bargaining equalizes sectoral differences and, as such, we expect the gender 
pay gap to be negatively associated with this labor market institution. Economic 
competition negatively affects the gender pay gap, because firms would eliminate 
discrimination against females to minimize costs in a highly competitive market 
(Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2002). Public employment is another indicator of 
wage compression, because public sectors are more inclined than private sectors to 
equalize wages for their employees (Kolberg, 1991). Finally, the analysis includes a 
direct measure of the 90th percentile minus 10th percentile wage gap for males and for 
females (Blau and Kohn, 2003).  
The General Method of Moments (GMM), proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), is used and the results are presented in Table 3 and denote again that MP shocks 
are positively associated with the gender pay gap. Moreover, a 100-base point (1%) 
increase in interest rate shocks, increases the gap by 0.8 points. In terms of the 
remaining variables, taxes and pay dispersion have a positive impact, while centralized 
bargaining, economic competition and the public to private employment exert a 
negative effect on the gap. It is evident that both the test for AR(2) of disturbances and 
the Hansen test fail to reject the validity of the instruments used. 24 instruments have 
been used in the estimation process.  
Table 3  
Estimates of the impact of monetary policy shocks on gender pay gap. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables            coefficient          p-value 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Constant    0.123   0.19 
Gender pay gap(-1)   0.586***  0.00 
Monetary policy shocks  0.008***  0.00 
Monetary policy shocks(-1)  0.003**  0.03 
Taxes     0.039***  0.00 
Taxes(-1)    0.015**  0.02 
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Taxes(-2)    0.007*   0.06 
Centralized bargaining  -0.032***  0.01 
Economic competition  -0.048***  0.00 
Economic competition(-1)  -0.018**  0.05 
Public employment   -0.055***  0.00 
Public employment(-1)  -0.021**  0.04 
Pay dispersion    0.038**  0.03 
Pay dispersion(-1)   0.023*   0.06 
Diagnostics 
R2      0.68       
AR(1)      [0.00]       
AR(2)     [0.38]       
Hansen test    [0.55]       
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: AR(1)- the first-order test for residual autocorrelation. AR(2)- the test for autocorrelation of order 
2. Hansen- the test for the validity of instruments. Estimations were performed under fixed effects and 
time dummies. Lags were determined through the Akaike criterion. *: p≤0.10; **: p≤0.05; ***: p≤0.01.  
 
3. Conclusion 
This paper explored the link between MP and the gender pay gap by assessing 
the role of them on the gap. MP shocks had positive effects on the gender pay gap across 
UK households. The findings carry important implications for MP modeling where the 
heterogeneity of households should be explicitly considered, while policymakers 
should be more cautious with their decisions as they carry welfare effects in terms of 
changing gender pay gaps. Finally, future venues could also explore the channels 
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through which MP shocks impact gender pay gaps, such as income and wealth 
composition, financial segmentation and redistributive inflation or portfolio holdings, 
savings redistribution, and earnings heterogeneity. 
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